Defamation & the Protection of Public Participation Act (BC): Hamer-Jackson v. Neustaeter, 2026 BCSC 155

The BC Supreme Court decision in Hamer-Jackson v. Neustaeter, 2026 BCSC 155 provides a good illustration of the law and what can happen when a member of council sues another member of council for defamation. In this case, the Mayor of Kamloops, Reid Hamer-Jackson, sued a member of council, Katie Neustaeter, for defamation. At the material time, the relationship between the Mayor and City Councillors was conflicted due in part to the fact that some City Councillors, including Councillor Neustaeter, took issue with the manner in which the Mayor was conducting himself.

The allegedly defamatory statements in issue in the action stemmed from interactions between the Mayor and Councillor Neustaeter’s father, Kevin Krueger. Mr. Krueger was a former long-time Member of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, and respected member of the Kamloops community. In the course of the Mayor’s October 2022 election campaign and thereafter, Mr. Krueger reached out to the Mayor on multiple occasions to express his support. At the time, Councillor Neustaeter was concerned about Mr. Krueger’s health. He had been diagnosed with a neurological disorder which leads to dementia and as of October 2022, Councillor Neustaeter believed that he was suffering from dementia. As such, Councillor Neustaeter was concerned that Mr. Krueger was vulnerable to being taken advantage of and asked the Mayor not to engage with him. Despite Councillor Neustaeter’s request, the Mayor continued to respond to overtures from Mr. Krueger.

Based on a conversation he had with Mr. Krueger in January 2023, the Mayor formed the view that Councillor Neustaeter was unwarrantedly attempting to have Mr. Krueger committed despite him being of sound mind. The Mayor subsequently interjected Mr. Krueger’s support for him and health issues into City Council business. In response, Councillor Neustaeter asked the Mayor to, among other things, stop harassing and involving her father in his dealings, respect personal boundaries, and keep colleagues’ family members out of the political sphere. Councillor Neustaeter’s responses to that effect and a subsequent public statement criticizing the Mayor’s conduct as Mayor, were the allegedly defamatory statements in issue in the legal action.

Councillor Neustaeter submitted that the Mayor’s defamation action ought to be dismissed under the Protection of Public Participation Act (BC) (“PPPA”) because her statements constituted expression on matters of public interest—specifically, expression regarding the political decision-making and debate process—and were are no grounds to believe that she did not have valid defences. With respect to her defences, Councillor Neustaeter raised defences of qualified privilege, fair comment, lesser defamatory meaning, and substantial truth. Councillor Neustaeter also submitted that even if she has not raised any valid defences, the public interest in protecting her freedom of expression outweighed the public interest in remedying any harm to the Mayor.

The court provided an analysis of the PPPA and noted that the PPPA targets strategic lawsuits against public participation (“SLAPP”). While a typical SLAPP claim involves a powerful or wealthy plaintiff using litigation to silence criticism from a comparatively under-resourced defendant, not all SLAPPs fit within this archetype (Siman v. Eisenbrandt, 2024 BCCA 176  (“Siman”) at para. 32). The common defining feature is that “the proceeding acts to silence the defendant, and more broadly, to suppress debate on matters of public interest, rather than to remedy serious harm suffered by the plaintiff” (Siman at para. 32, citing Hansman v. Neufeld, 2023 SCC 14 (“Hansman”) at para. 48).

Section 4 of the PPPA sets out the procedure for the pre-trial dismissal of actions that target speech on matters of public interest. The framework for the analysis of an application under s. 4 of the PPPA is guided by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Hansman, 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22 (“Pointes”) and Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23 (“Bent”), and the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Siman. Under s. 4(1) of the PPPA, the applicant (the defendant in the alleged SLAPP lawsuit) bears a threshold burden to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the alleged SLAPP lawsuit arises from an expression made by the applicant relating to a matter of public interest. If the applicant fails to meet this burden, the application will fail and the alleged SLAPP lawsuit will not be dismissed (Siman at para. 35, citing Pointes at paras. 21–23).

If the applicant discharges their threshold burden under s. 4(1) of the PPPA, then the burden shifts to the respondent (the plaintiff in the alleged SLAPP lawsuit) under s. 4(2) to satisfy the court that there are “grounds to believe” that the proceeding has substantial merit, and that the applicant (the defendant in the alleged SLAPP lawsuit) does not have a valid defence in the proceeding (Siman at para. 36). The assessment under s. 4(2) is subjective and does not connote a theoretical assessment by a “reasonable trier” (Siman at para. 38, citing Pointes at para. 41). The “grounds to believe” standard requires something more than mere suspicion, but less than proof on the balance of probabilities. The “grounds to believe” standard will be met if there is any basis in the record and the law—provided it is legally tenable and reasonably capable of belief—to support a finding of substantial merit and the absence of a valid defence (Bent at para. 88). The “grounds to believe” standard requires “something more than mere suspicion, but less than…proof on the balance of probabilities” (Pointes at para. 40, quoting Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 at para. 114).

At the final step of the analysis, s. 4(2)(b) of the PPPA requires the respondent (the plaintiff in the alleged SLAPP lawsuit) to satisfy the Court that the likely harm they have suffered, or will suffer, due to the defendant’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. This balancing exercise serves as a “robust backstop” for the Court to dismiss even technically meritorious claims if the public interest in protecting the expression outweighs the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue (Siman at para. 43, citing Pointes at paras. 53, 61-62; Hansman at para. 58. The PPPA instructs courts to dismiss “even claims with substantial merit … where the public interest in preserving free debate outweighs the harm to the plaintiff that the litigation purports to address” (Hansman at paras. 5, 51).

The court ruled in favour of Councillor Neustaeter finding that the impugned statements were expressions made by her on matters of public interest and that there were grounds to believe that Councillor Neustaeter had a valid defence of qualified privilege with respect to each of the allegedly defamatory statements. The court also found that the harm to the Mayor, if any, resulting from Councillor Neustaeter’s expression were not sufficiently serious that the public interest in continuing this proceeding outweighed the public interest in protecting Councillor Neustaeter’s expression. As such, the court concluded that the Mayor’s defamation action must be dismissed under s. 4(2) of the PPPA.